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Abstract. The Braess paradox describes the counterintuitive situation that the
addition of new roads to road networks can lead to higher travel times for all network
users. Recently we could show that user optima leading to the paradox exist in
networks of microscopic transport models. We derived phase diagrams for two kinds
of route choice strategies that were externally tuned and applied by all network users.
Here we address the question whether these user optima are still realized if intelligent
route choice decisions are made based upon two kinds of traffic information. We find
that the paradox still can occur if the drivers 1) make informed decisions based on
their own past experiences or 2) use traffic information similar to that provided by
modern navigation apps. This indicates that modern traffic information systems are
not able to resolve Braess’ paradox.
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1. Introduction
Everyday experience shows that we spend a lot of time in traffic jams [1–3]. This time
can add up to more than 100h per year in certain parts of the world [4]. Two potential
solutions to the problem of congestions come to mind: 1) building more roads and 2)
providing traffic information for the drivers to make better decisions. However, it is
known for some time that new roads are not necessarily a solution. The Fundamental
Law of Road Congestion [4] states that more roads will lead to more road users which
will lead to congestions on the new roads as well.
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Even if the traffic volume does not increase, new roads will not necessarily lead
to an improvement, e.g. shorter travel times for the drivers. This paradoxical fact has
been established rigorously 50 years ago by Braess [5, 6] and is now commonly known
as Braess’ paradox. In compact form it can be formulated in the following way:
In road networks of selfish users additional roads can lead to higher travel times
for all users.
Although it is formulated using terminology from traffic engineering, the paradox has
been shown to occur in a variety of other systems as well, ranging from general transport
networks [7–9] to mechanical and electrical systems [10, 11], pedestrian dynamics [12],
microfluidic networks [13], oscillator networks and power grids [14, 15]. A review of
some examples from mechanical systems, biological networks, to power grids can be
found in [16].
Braess has exemplified the paradox for a simple network that has just five edges.
One of the essential ingredients for the occurrence of the paradox is that one has to
distinguish two different kinds of optima in the system, the user optimum (uo, also called
Nash equilibrium), and the system optimum (so) [17]. The uo is realized if network users
distribute themselves onto the routes such that the travel times of all used routes are
equal and lower than those of any unused routes. It reflects the perspective of individual
drivers who can not improve their travel times by choosing a different route and is thus
widely considered to be the stable state of a traffic network used by selfish users. The
so corresponds to a global perspective, e.g. of an engineer or politician. In the so the
drivers are distributed onto the routes such that a global parameter is minimal. Several
different global parameters could be considered. Prominent examples are the weighted
average of all travel times [17] or the sum of the travel times of all drivers [18]. Braess
considered yet another definition of the system optimum: in his work [5, 6] as well as
in our previous works on the Braess paradox [19, 20] and also in the present article
the system optimum is defined as the state which minimizes the maximum travel time
of all used roads. Indeed, the uo and the so can be different in certain situations, i.e.
correspond to a different distribution of drivers on the available routes.
Braess’ example [5, 6] consists of simple networks with 4 and 5 links (where links
represent roads), respectively. In the network with 4 links, the uo and so coincide. The
addition of a new road (i.e. the fifth link) changes the network such that the uo and
so become different, or – more specifically – in the network that includes the new road,
the individual travel times in the uo are larger than those in the so. The travel time
functions are chosen in such a way, that the travel times in the uo of the network with
the fifth link are higher than those in the network without the fifth link.
Although the paradox considers a simplified scenario, it has been observed in several
real world situations. Newly built roads can worsen the traffic situation, or inversely,
the closing of roads can improve traffic [21–23]. A concept related to Braess’ paradox is
the price of anarchy. It measures the reduced efficiency of a system due to the selfish
behavior of agents [24].
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Braess’ original work is based on a macroscopic mathematical model of freeway
traffic. A lot of further research effort was made and let to a more coherent
understanding of the paradox in such mathematical models [7–9, 18, 25–27]. In previous
works [19, 20] we have studied the original Braess network with a more realistic traffic
dynamics that e.g. includes stochastic fluctuations. In these microscopic models, all cars
are considered individually. By varying the route choice decisions of the drivers, the user
optima of the networks with and without the new road were found. The travel times
in the user optima of the two different versions of the networks were then compared.
These systems show rich phase diagrams which include extended regions where Braess’
paradox can be observed. More specifically, two different cases of the drivers’ route
choice decisions have been distinguished: 1) routes are chosen stochastically by each
driver [19], and 2) drivers use fixed strategies for their route choices [20].
In the aforementioned research based on macroscopic and microscopic models,
Braess’ paradox is found in the sense that, for the same amount of cars, user optima exist
such that those of the networks with the new road have higher travel times than those
of the corresponding networks without the new road. For the case of perfectly rationally
deciding drivers with access to perfect traffic information, one can assume that these
user optima would indeed be realized and that thus the Braess paradox would really
be observed. The question that remains is if those potentially accessible user optimum
states are also realized in more realistic situations with real (imperfectly deciding) human
network users who base their decisions on real (imperfect) traffic information.
In fact it has been shown that often travel time minimization is not the only factor
determining route choice decisions [28–30] and that even if it is, drivers do not decide
perfectly rational on this basis [31, 32]. Therefore variations of the above mentioned
definition of the user optimum were introduced [33, 34]. While perfect traffic information
is also not present in road networks, with the introduction of smartphone routing apps
and personal navigational systems, more accurate information is available [35]. It has
recently been shown, that this might actually lead to the realisation of user optima in
some cases of road networks [36, 37].
Here we examine whether Braess’ paradox is realized in a microscopic transport
model if users decide intelligently based upon information similar to that available
for real modern day road networks. This is meant in the following sense: are the
user optima in the systems with and without the new road which are accessible by
externally tuning the users’ decisions reached if users intelligently base their decisions
on information similar to that available in present day real world networks. Two types
of traffic information are considered: information based on the drivers own memory or
experience (as e.g. in a commuter scenario) and information similar to that provided
by smartphone apps. It is shown that both types drive the system into its user optima,
realizing Braess’ paradox. This is a strong indication for answering the question if the
paradox still occurs in present day road networks or if it is potentially resolved due to
modern traffic information: it seems that the paradox is indeed still of great importance!
It is furthermore shown that user optima of different phases of the system (that do not
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show Braess’ paradox) are also realized. We conclude that the phase diagrams derived
in [19, 20] are ‘realistic’.
2. Background information
Before presenting the results of our study we define some terminology and provide some
more details about Braess’ paradox and some background to traffic information and
route choice processes. Then we define the model investigated here and give a short
summary of previous results.
2.1. Some terminology
Since this paper is concerned with traffic networks we will use the terms “edge” and
“road” interchangeably. A “route” is a connection between an origin and a destination
in a traffic network. A route can be comprised of multiple roads and also of so-called
“junction sites” which connect roads. The “travel time” of a road refers to the time it
takes to traverse the road. The travel time on a route refers to the time needed to traverse
the route, i.e. to get from the origin to the destination on that route. Furthermore,
the terms “car” and “particle” are used interchangeably as well as “driver”, “user” and
“agent”.
A “strategy” of an agent refers to its route choice. Two specific types of strategies
that were used in our previous research [19, 20] are “pure strategies” and “mixed
strategies”. For pure strategies the driver chooses exactly one specific route, whereas
“mixed strategy” refers to the case in which one route is chosen out of several routes
with a certain probability. In real road networks, if a network user has to perform route
choices repeatedly, e.g. mixtures of these two strategy-types can be at play. A “state”
of the network is given by the distribution of the cars onto the routes, i.e. the set of the
strategies of all drivers.
The “user optimum” state is often considered to be the stable state of traffic
networks with “selfish users”, i.e. agents who choose their routes non-altruistically only
according to their own intentions. The user optimum is reached if the travel times of all
cars are such that they are equal on all used routes and, at the same time, lower than
those of any unused routes [17]. A “pure user optimum” (puo) is reached if all agents
follow pure strategies. In this case the numbers of cars using each route are integer
numbers (or zero). This corresponds to a “pure Nash equilibrium” in game theory [38].
A “mixed user optimum” (muo) is reached if all agents follow mixed strategies and the
mean values of the travel times of all used routes are equal and lower than those of any
unused routes. In this case the average numbers of cars following routes can be positive
non-integer values or zero. It corresponds to a “mixed Nash equilibrium” [38].
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2.2. The Braess paradox
The original example. The network proposed by Braess in his original work [5, 6] is
shown in Fig. 1. In his scenario all agents move from the same origin to the same
destination. Road 5 is the road which is added to the system. Thus in the network
without road 5, which we call “4link network” from now on, there are two routes from
origin to destination: route 14 and route 23. In the network with road 5, called “5link
network” in the following, there is the additional route 153 to the destination‡. In the
Figure 1. Braess’ network as presented in his original work [5, 6]. All agents move
from the same origin to the same destination. There are three routes available, named
after the edges they are comprised of: routes 14, 23 and 153. Edge 5 is supposed to
be newly added to the network. Route 153 is only available after this addition. The
networks without and with edge 5 are called 4link and 5link networks, respectively.
original example, traffic flow was characterized only by travel time functions Ti linear
in the number of cars n using road i:
T1 = T3 = 10n, (1)
T2 = T4 = 50 + n, (2)
T5 = 10 + n. (3)
The 4link network is thus symmetric.
Braess showed that for a total number of N = 6 cars, the pure user optimum
of the 4link network is given by half the cars using route 14 and the other half route
23, respectively: n
(4)
14,puo = n
(4)
23,puo = 3. This results in equal travel times of both
routes: T (4)puo = T
(4)
14,puo = T
(4)
23,puo = 83. In the 5link network the pure user optimum
is given by n
(5)
14,puo = n
(5)
23,puo = n
(5)
153,puo = 2 with equal travel times on all routes,
T (5)puo = T
(5)
14,puo = T
(5)
23,puo = T
(5)
153,puo = 92. Thus, T
(5)
puo > T
(4)
puo, i.e. the new road leads to
larger pure user optimum travel times.
‡ Routes are named according to the (ordered!) edges they are comprised of. From here on, variables
corresponding to the 4link and 5link networks are marked with superscripts (4) and (5), respectively.
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The paradox is also observed if all cars follow mixed strategies§. For N = 6, in the
4link network the mixed user optimum state is found if routes 14 and 23 are chosen with
equal probabilities: p
(4)
14,muo = p
(4)
23,muo = 1/2. This leads to equal travel time expectation
values of 〈 T (4)muo 〉 = 〈 T
(4)
14,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(4)
23,muo 〉 = 88.5. In the 5link system the mixed user
optimum is given for p
(5)
14,muo = p
(5)
23,muo = 5/13 and p
(5)
153,muo = 3/13 with travel time
expectation values 〈 T (5)muo 〉 = 〈 T
(5)
14,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(5)
23,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(5)
153,muo 〉 = 93.6923. Thus also
in the case of mixed user optima, 〈 T (5)muo 〉 > 〈 T
(4)
muo 〉.
Results of further research. Since the initial description of the paradox by Braess a
lot of efforts were made to understand the phenomenon in more detail in the context
of mathematical models of traffic networks. It was shown that in the original model
of Braess, the paradox occurs for several amounts of total users, and not only for
Braess’ specific example of N = 6 [9]. The paradox also occurs for different choices
of (linear) travel time functions in Braess’ original network [25] and also in different
network topologies [18]. A general framework for predicting the occurrence of the
paradox in networks of uncorrelated links was established [7, 26]. Mathematical models
including correlations between the roads were studied in [8]. It was furthermore shown
for arbitrary networks and models with monotonically increasing travel time functions,
that if the paradox occurs at a certain density, the new road will be ignored completely
for densities higher than a certain threshold [27].
2.3. Braess’ paradox in TASEP networks
In an attempt to get an understanding of the paradox in a more realistic context,
in two recent articles [19, 20] we have shown that the Braess paradox can also be
observed in networks of stochastic, microscopic traffic models, i.e. in networks of totally
asymmetric exclusion processes (TASEPs). The description of traffic flow in Braess’
original example, as summarized above, was rather basic, being more of a proof of
principle instead of a realistic model. Braess used only linear travel time functions
which is not realistic. In addition, microscopic interactions and the stochastic nature of
traffic were omitted. Furthermore, correlations between the roads were not taken into
account.
Modelling traffic flow in the network by coupled TASEP segments is a first step to
a more realistic traffic description by including these aspects while, at the same time,
keeping the system simple enough to be analysed. There is a vast amount of research
dedicated to the many variants of TASEPs and their properties. For some condensed
information the reader is referred to e.g. [39–41].
The Braess network of TASEPs for two different route assignment types is shown
in Figure 2. The network has the same structure as Braess’ original network (Fig. 1).
The edges Ei are now made up of TASEPs of lengths Li joined through junction sites
jk. Furthermore we use periodic boundary conditions via the additional link E0. This
§ For a more detailed discussion of the mixed user optima, see Appendix A.
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Figure 2. Braess’ network of TASEPs with periodic boundary conditions for two
different types of externally tuned strategies. The structure of the network corresponds
to that used by Braess in his original article, as shown in Figure 1. Here, edges E1 to
E5 are made up of TASEPs, coupled through junction sites j1 to j4. The added edge
E0 realizes the periodic boundary conditions. Part (a) shows the system with fixed
strategies, in which fixed numbers of cars Ni use routes i as studied in [20]. In part
(b) the system with turning probabilities, as studied in [19], is shown. Particles sitting
on junctions j1 or j2 turn left with probabilities γ and δ, respectively.
has the advantage that the total number of particles M is conserved which allows to
compare the travel times of the 4link and 5link systems in their respective user optima
for the same number of particles. To reduce the number of parameters, in the following
we will present results only for the following edge lengths:
L1 = L3 = 100 , L2 = L4 = 500 , L0 = 1 . (4)
The length of E5 will be varied, subject to the condition that the length of the new
route is smaller or equal to that of the two old routes (which are of equal length).
Figure 2 (a) shows the network with fixed personal strategies as analysed in [20]. In
this case, each particle keeps its personal pure strategy of always choosing one specific
route. Numbers ofN14, N23, andN153 particles choose routes 14, 23 and 153 respectively,
with N14+N23+N153 = M . The three numbers N14, N23, and N153 can also be expressed
through the two quantities
n
(j1)
l = 1−
N23
M
, (5)
n
(j2)
l =
N14
N14 +N153
, (6)
which describe the fraction of particles turning ’left’ at junctions j1 and j2. User optima
can be found by varying the N14, N23, N153. The user optima obtained in this scenario
are pure user optima.
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In Figure 2 (b), the network with the route assignment procedure governed by
turning probabilities, as studied in [19], is shown. In this case all particles are equal.
A particle on junction j1 jumps to the left (i.e. onto E1) with probability γ and to the
right (i.e. onto E2) with probability 1 − γ. In the 5link network, particles on junction
j2 jump left (i.e. onto E4) and right (i.e. onto E5) with probabilities δ and 1 − δ,
respectively. User optima in this network are found by varying the γ and δ. They are
mixed user optima.
These two types of route assignment are from here on called “externally tuned
strategies”. This is meant in the sense that all decisions are set at the beginning of each
simulation run externally, i.e. not intelligently by the particles themselves. These route
choices will later on be distinguished from route choice decisions made by ‘intelligent’
agents following our route choice algorithm.
The phase diagrams for both networks are shown in Fig. 3. The phase of the system
depends on the ratio Lˆ153/Lˆ14 of the lengths of the new route 153, Lˆ153, and the two
old routes, Lˆ14 = Lˆ23; and the global density. Since the phase of the system describes
how the travel times of the 4link and 5link systems’ user optima are related, the global
densities of both systems ρ
(4)
global = M/(4 +
∑4
i=0 Li) and ρ
(5)
global = M/(4 +
∑5
i=0 Li) are
shown.
Figure 3. Phase diagrams of Braess’ network of TASEPs (Fig. 2) for (a) fixed route
choices and (b) turning probabilities. The phase of the system depends on the route
length ratio Lˆ153/Lˆ14 between the new and old routes and the global densities ρ
(4/5)
global
in 4link/5link systems. In both phase diagrams four states ⋆1 to ⋆4 are marked. The
route choice algorithm presented in the present paper is tested on these states (Sec. 4).
The detailed parameters of the four states are described in Appendix B. The shown
phase diagrams are simplified, as e.g. sub-phases are not shown. For full details, see
[19, 20].
In both systems at low densities the user optima in the 5link networks have lower
travel times than those of the corresponding 4link networks, thus the system is not in a
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Braess phase (“no Braess”/green phases). The Braess paradox is observed in significant
parts of the phase spaces of both systems (“Braess”/red phases). In both systems at
higher densities no user optima could be found due to gridlocks (orange phase) and
fluctuating domain walls (blue phase) in the system with fixed strategies and turning
probabilities, respectively. For more detailed phase diagrams and explanations, the
reader is referred to [19, 20].
The phase diagrams were obtained by assigning the particles onto their routes
externally via the (N14, N23, N153) and (γ, δ). By varying these parameters, user optima
were found and the travel times of the 4link and corresponding 5link systems were
compared to construct the phase diagrams. In the present article we address the question
if these user optima are actually realized if the particles choose their routes intelligently,
based on different kinds of information. As in the original example presented by Braess
in his mathematical model, the pure and mixed user optima for one combination of
the (Lˆ153/Lˆ14, ρ
(4/5)
global) do not necessarily coincide, i.e. the (n
(j1)
l , n
(j2)
l ) and (γ, δ) which
realize a pure and mixed user optimum respectively do not always have equal values.
In the following, we summarize some results of previous research on traffic
information and route choice processes and then present our route choice algorithm.
This algorithm is then applied to the four states marked in Figure 3. The travel times
of the user optima of these states can be found in Appendix B.
2.4. Types of traffic information
Information about the state of traffic networks is called traffic information. It can
consist of information on various aspects of the traffic network, such as the positions
of all vehicles, average speeds, traffic light phases and many more. Here we focus
specifically on information about travel times on roads and routes in the network.
Information available to network users can be grouped into two main categories.
(i) “Public Information” is in principle accessible to all network users.
(ii) “Personal Information” is only known to individual network users. It is usually
based on the user’s personal experience and/or specifically designed for a specific
user, e.g. based on his/her current position, destination etc.
These two main categories can contain information from three different sub-
categories [42].
a) “Historical Information” describes travel times measured in the network in previous
time periods.
b) “Current Information” refers to the most up-to-date information available. It can be
given in the form of providing network users with the current state of the network,
e.g. providing the current traffic densities or the currently measured (average)
speeds on certain routes as e.g. in [43].
If one sticks strictly to this definition, in real traffic networks travel time information
cannot be current information. This is due to the following problem: if e.g. a
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network user finishes a trip in a given moment and her experienced travel time
information is immediately made available to the public, this information does not
represent the travel time in the network right in that moment. It is instead the
travel time of the used route at the current time minus the measured travel time.
In the current moment the traffic situation might have changed and a user choosing
the same route right now might experience a different travel time.
c) “Predictive Information” is e.g. given in the form of estimated travel times for the
routes. In contrast to the two other types of information, predictive information
can – by its nature – not be guaranteed to be accurate. If predictive information
is given to network users in the context of route choices, a specific dilemma occurs:
the information potentially influences the agents, leading them to take certain
route choice decisions which then change the traffic state and thus invalidate
the information [44]. A special kind of predictive information is “prescriptive
information” which – opposed to “descriptive information” which only describes
network states – advises network users to use specific routes [35].
Network users may have access to combinations of all these types of information and
make their own individual route choice decisions based upon them.
2.4.1. Traffic Information Available in Present Day Road Networks In present day
road networks various kinds of information are available. Individual network users might
have personal historical information about travel times on specific routes based on their
own experiences if they used these routes before (personal historical information, in this
case also called “experiential information” [35]). This is often the case in commuter
scenarios. Furthermore, individual users might have some insights from friends or other
personal sources. Public information of various kinds is available from numerous sources.
Public historical information can be found in internet databases and is also available in
various smartphone routing apps and personal navigational systems. Current public
information is available from radio traffic forecasting and various advanced traffic
information systems (ATIS) [45] such as variable road signs.
Personal navigational systems and smartphone routing apps also provide predictive
public information. This type of information is considered public since these devices are
in principle accessible for everyone. In contrast to the former mentioned information,
these tools also provide prescriptive route choice information. Among many alternatives,
Google Maps was the most popular routing app in the US in 2018 [46]. The main
difference from more traditional types of traffic information is that such apps rely on
crowdsourcing [47]. This means that all users of the app send their location data to
Google where this data is in turn used to get an accurate picture of the current traffic
situation of the network (given there are enough Google Maps users in the network at
that moment). This current information is combined with large quantities of historical
information to provide fairly accurate public predictive (prescriptive) information (about
travel times). Details about how the Google Maps algorithm works are not known to
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the public [47, 48].
To approximate the situation which is found in real modern road networks in this
article we consider user decisions based on personal historical and public predictive
information. A mixture of these two types of information is found in real road networks,
especially in commuter scenarios.
The detailed knowledge of current traffic states available due to crowd sourced
information could also be used to provide information to road users that aims at
optimizing the state of the whole traffic system. Such information would be given in
different forms than just information about (predictive) travel times on available routes.
It could be designed e.g. to drive traffic networks into their system optima and could
thus lead to a reduction of traffic congestion, as shown e.g. in [49]. Even though the
necessary data for such information is in principle available, such systems are (to our
knowledge) currently not in use, which is why they are not considered here.
2.5. Previous research on route choices
The question how road users choose their routes given certain types of traffic information
and consequently the question if user optima are realized in networks of selfish users
has been analysed in various scientific disciplines. The research approaches can be
subdivided into three groups: analyses of real world data, mathematical models and
simulation studies, and laboratory experiments.
2.5.1. Analysis of real world data Since traffic networks are generally highly complex
structures with numerous users that all decide individually it is difficult to gain
objective knowledge about what drives the decision making processes in these networks.
Next to much anecdotal knowledge about route choices, some large scale real world
observations and experiments were performed. A study from 2001 [29] hints at travel
time minimization not being the only factor driving route choice decisions. Furthermore,
travel time seems to be systematically misperceived by many drivers [28]. In a study
in which vehicles of a large number of network users were equipped with GPS units it
was shown that only approximately one third of traffic network users chooses the fastest
available path [30]. For a nice recap of results of previous research, the reader is also
referred to [30].
The introduction of smartphone routing apps lead to a different usage of road
networks in many parts of the world. Data suggests that minimal travel time becomes
more important when using those apps and hints at the realization of user optima due
to the heavy usage of these tools [37]. There are also many negative side-effects of such
tools, such as increasing use of smaller side roads to avoid congested main roads, leading
to complaints by residents [50].
An effect that has already been predicted in mathematical traffic models [42, 51]
and queueing models [52] and was observed in simulations [44] has also been observed
as a consequence of routing apps: routing apps provide predictive information about
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travel times based on the current network state to all users. This information may then
influence the users’ decisions in such a way that these decisions invalidate the prediction.
This so-called “overreaction” [42] has been observed in networks with routing apps [37].
2.5.2. Mathematical models and simulation studies In earlier days, research on route
choices was performed using mathematical models [42, 51, 53] which already predicted
many effects that were later confirmed e.g. by simulations. In [54, 55] the Braess paradox
was considered in a discrete time macroscopic mathematical model. It was shown that
in the given model, the user optima leading to Braess’ paradox can be avoided with a
special kind of personal historical information.
For route choice research on the basis of microscopic simulations it has proven to be
useful to implement so-called “multi-agent techniques” [44, 56]. The traffic flow itself,
forming the “tactical layer”, is modelled by a stochastic microscopic traffic model. The
acquisition of information and the route choice decisions, the so-called “strategic layer”,
are modelled by an algorithm. This multi-agent approach is also used in the present
paper.
Multi-agent models with the tactical layer being described by the Nagel-
Schreckenberg model [57] have been studied for certain types of traffic information:
It was shown that the availability of public historical information in a symmetric
two-route network with open boundary conditions leads to oscillations around the
user optimum [44]. In [44] the latest experienced travel times on both routes were
made available to all network users. This leads to overreactions since this travel time
information is based on the network states previous to when the information is made
available. The user optimum is reached when agents choose each route with equal
probability. Instead oscillations between periods of all cars using just one route and
times of all cars using just the other route are realized. This observation lead to the
proposition of many other types of information with the aim of realizing the user optima
in this specific network (see e.g. [58–60]). A good review of these information types and
how they perform is found in [61]. There it is also pointed out that most of these realize
user optima only in the specific symmetric two route scenario. It was also shown that
the paradox can be observed in the Braess network, if traffic flow is modelled by the
Nagel-Schreckenberg model [55].
In [62] a two route model with periodic boundary conditions and dynamics similar
to TASEP is studied with users with personal historical information, i.e. users that have
memories of certain lengths that decide based on their own experiences. It is shown that
this type of information realizes user optima in the network. This is similar to some of
the results to be presented later in the present paper.
Large-scale simulations of systems with information similar to that provided by
smartphones suggest that user optima are realized in these systems [37]. To our
knowledge no models based on simulations in connection with personal historical
information or public predictive information like that provided by smartphones,
implemented in the way given in the present paper, have been studied in controlled
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small networks like the present Braess network.
2.5.3. Laboratory experiments Next to research based on mathematical models
and simulations which was mainly conducted in the traffic science and traffic
engineering community, in the social sciences and behavioral economics many laboratory
experiments on route choice processes were performed with the aim of understanding
how humans decide. Typically, a road network is implemented and the traffic flow is
described by a mathematical model. Human subjects are then asked to perform route
choices repeatedly given various types of information. Usually real money is paid out
as an incentive to perform well in the task of travel time minimization.
A nice review of route choice experiments is found in [63]. Here we focus on
experiments that either directly address the Braess paradox or are closely related. In [32]
and [35] scenarios with two and three unconnected links from origin to destination were
studied, respectively. In both studies, when participants relied on personal historical
information, i.e. their own experience of travel times of previous rounds, user optima
were reached on average with some persisting fluctuations. In [32] also the situation
with public historical information, in which participants had knowledge of travel times
also on routes not taken, was studied. The user optimum was also reached on average.
In [64] route choice decisions in the 5link version of the Braess network were studied
in a virtual experiment. Participants had to chose routes daily in the app “WeChat”.
Subject to public historical information the user optimum was reached.
In [31] the Braess paradox was tested directly in the laboratory. Participants
performed route choices first in Braess’ 4link and then in the 5link network. Subject
to public historical information user optima were reached in both cases (in the 4link
on average, while fluctuations decreased in the 5link) and the paradox was realized.
In a further network of different topology, Braess’ paradox was realized as well [31].
Furthermore, in [65] another network exhibiting Braess-behaviour was studied. The
paradox was also realized here.
2.5.4. How research from the different areas connects The research performed in the
different scientific disciplines employing the various approaches mentioned above all add
to the understanding of route choice processes while all of them have their advantages
and disadvantages. In observations of real world data, typically the system cannot
be controlled as well as in the toy systems studied in simulations and laboratory
experiments. Here, there is always a larger underlying network. The objective of the
‘participants’ is not clear either. Nevertheless, on one hand, this lead to important
discoveries such as the minimization of travel time not necessarily being the sole goal of
network users. On the other hand, these conclusions cannot be proven rigorously, since
the objectives and motivations for the route choice of the agents are not known.
The two more controlled approaches also differ in important ways: in all the works
cited in the paragraph on laboratory experiments, the traffic description is limited to
deterministic, macroscopic travel time functions of the individual roads in the network.
CONTENTS 15
Microscopic interactions are omitted and furthermore correlations between the roads
are not modelled. Since these omitted details lead to a much more complicated traffic
behavior in real traffic networks, as travel times could e.g. change more drastically if
many drivers change their strategies, one can argue that drivers reactions could also be
different in these cases. Thus it is not really clear if the laboratory observations really
transfer to the real world. In research based on simulations, the tactical layer, i.e. the
description of traffic flow, is more realistic, whereas the route choice decisions, i.e. the
strategic layer, is not as realistic since it is not done by real humans.
Drawing from the observations of real world data one also has to note that the
results from laboratory experiments cannot be taken as facts since in real world data
it was observed that travel time minimization is not necessarily the main objective of
drivers. In laboratory experiments nevertheless it is the sole objective by design of the
experiment.
3. Route choice algorithms
To find out whether user optima are realized in the 4link and 5link versions of a Braess
network of TASEPs (Fig. 2), when used by intelligently deciding agents, we implemented
the following route choice algorithm. We examined variants where the agents have access
to personal historical and public predictive information. With this we want to combine
a more realistic tactical layer (i.e. a microscopic traffic modelled by coupled TASEPs)
with a more realistic strategic layer with decisions based on realistic traffic information.
Due to the periodic boundary conditions all M particles stay in the system and
thus decisions based on personal experiences, i.e. on the memory of the particles, can
be implemented.
The system is always initialized by placing M particles on the routes randomly
and assigning an initial pure strategy (to choose either route 14, 23 or 153) randomly
to each agent. The system then undergoes a relaxation procedure which is different
depending on the type of information used. The relaxation procedures are explained in
the following paragraphs which describe the different types of implemented information.
Once the system is relaxed, all agents have information about the (expected) travel times
of all routes. The information for all three routes 14, 23 and 153 is from now on called
T14,info, T23,info and T153,info, respectively. If an agent went once from j1 to E0 (i.e. after
jumping out of j4), this agent has finished one “round”.
After relaxation is complete, route choice decisions can occur at three points: before
starting a new round (when ‘sitting’ on E0) and during a round when sitting on j1 or
j2 and not being able to jump to the desired target site. Before a new round, when
sitting on E0 before jumping to j1, each particle generally chooses the route i with the
lowest Ti,info. To make such decisions more realistic, the two following parameters are
introduced to the algorithm.
(i) With probability pinfo the particle bases its decision on the available Ti,info. With
probability 1− pinfo the particle chooses one of the two or three routes (depending
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on whether the 4link or 5link system is simulated) randomly. The random decisions
are introduced to account for the findings from observations in the real world, that
users do not wholly base their decisions on the objective of minimizing travel times.
(ii) If, with probability pinfo as described in (i), an information-based decision will
be taken, the difference between the expected travel times on the routes ∆T =
|T14,info − T23,info| + |T14,info − T153,info| + |T23,info − T153,info| is calculated‖. If this
difference is below the threshold of ∆Tthres, the agent stays on the route of the
previous round. If ∆T ≥ ∆Tthres, the agent switches to the route with the lowest
Tinfo. Thus the agents act “boundedly rational” [34].
Additionally to these decisions before any new round, agents can make route choice
decisions during the rounds. These decisions work as follows. Consider an agent in the
4link network sitting on j1 who chose to take route 23 before the round began. If this
agent cannot jump to its target site (first site of E2) since this site is occupied, (s)he
may re-decide for another route. If T23,info ≥ T14,info (agent chose route 23 based on a
random decision before the round), (s)he will then immediately switch to route 14. If
T23,info < T14,info, the particle will keep trying to jump onto E2 for κj1,thres times the
to-be-expected saved time on route 23, i.e. for κj1,thres · (T14,info − T23,info) time steps. If
after this waiting time a jump to its target site is not possible (s)he will switch to the
other route.
This algorithm is slightly more complicated in the 5link system but works in the
same sense: if an agent, due to a random decision, chose a route which does not
have the lowest expected travel time and this route is blocked, (s)he will immediately
decide for another route. If the chosen route does have the lowest expected travel
time and the routes’ entrance is blocked, on j1 the agent will wait κj1,thres times the
to-be-expected saved travel time before switching. In the 5link network, an analogous
algorithm operates at junction j2 where the parameter κj2,thres is introduced. For more
details, see [66] where the algorithms for decision making are shown in pseudo code.
In the following the different types of information that are used for the algorithm are
explained. Furthermore the relaxation procedures used in the simulations are explained.
3.1. Public historical information
Public historical information is implemented as follows: each time any user finishes one
round (jumps out of j4), the experienced travel time is recorded. This travel time is
then made available to all agents as their Tinfo. This information is historical since, as
explained in Sec. 2.4, the traffic state might have changed during the round. For this type
of information a short relaxation process is needed: at the beginning all agents follow
randomly assigned routes. As soon as each route has been used at least once, the system
is considered to be relaxed. It has already been shown that this type of information
does not lead to user optima in various two route scenarios but rather to very strong
‖ In the 4link system this expression reduces to ∆T = |T14,info − T23,info|
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oscillations around the user optimum (e.g. [44]). In [66] we show that the expected
oscillations in the 4link system / two route scenario can be reproduced. Furthermore it
is found that a similar behaviour occurs in the 5link / three route scenario. We do not
present these results here, since they do not offer new insights. The interested reader is
referred to [66].
3.2. Public predictive information
Public predictive information is provided on the basis of the current positions of all
agents in the network. It is implemented as an approximation of the traffic information
provided by smartphone apps in real road networks. To provide estimates of travel
times for all edges, the densities ρi are determined from the current number of particles
on each edge Ei: ρi = ni/Li where ni is the number of particles on edge Ei. From this
density a travel time prediction Ti,pred is calculated employing the formula
Ti,pred =
Li
1− ρi
. (7)
This equation is the exact stationary state expression for the travel time of a particle
in a TASEP of length Li with periodic boundary conditions and density ρi [19]. In our
case it is only an approximation for the travel time on an edge: the edges neither have
periodic boundary conditions nor are they (necessarily) in stationary states. It will show
to produce reasonably accurate approximations (at least at low global densities) in the
Braess network. From the approximated travel times of all edges the expected route
travel times, which are used as the traffic information for all agents in the route choice
algorithm, are calculated as
T14,info = T1,pred + T4,pred, (8)
T23,info = T2,pred + T3,pred, (9)
T153,info = T1,pred + T5,pred + T3,pred. (10)
Here further approximations are introduced: potential waiting times at the junction
sites are not considered and the system is only described in a mean field fashion since
correlations are neglected.
At each decision point the current Ti,info is calculated based on the current positions
of all particles. This means that if an agent bases its decision on the Ti,info before
starting a round and then re-decides on one of the junctions, the Ti,info might already
have changed at the time of the second decision.
For this type of information no relaxation process is required, the agents are just
placed on random positions in the network.
3.3. Personal historical information
Personal historical information is information based on the agents’ experiences from
previous rounds. Each agent is assigned a memory capacity of cmem rounds. For the
last cmem rounds, each agent remembers which routes it took and their corresponding
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travel times. From these times the Ti,info are calculated: they are the mean values of
the travel times of each route as experienced in the last cmem rounds. Additionally, each
agent remembers its last experienced travel times on all three routes. Like this, even if
e.g. route 23 was not used in the last cmem rounds, the agent will still remember the
travel time of that route from the last usage (that lies more than cmem rounds in the
past).
For this kind of information there is a two-fold relaxation process. First, each agent
is placed on a random position with a random strategy. Then it tries to gather one travel
time value for each route. Once these values are obtained, the system keeps evolving
until each agent has experienced cmem rounds. Once each agent used each route at least
once and has a filled its memory of capacity of cmem rounds, the system is considered
relaxed.
4. Simulation results
We applied the algorithms described in the previous section to determine the effects of
the route choice behavior in the Braess network with TASEP-based traffic dynamics.
The edge lengths L0, . . . , L4 are given by Eq. (4). We focussed on four different
combinations of L5, the length of the added edge, and M , the number of agents. These
are indicated by ⋆1 to ⋆4 in Figs. 3 (a) and (b). We applied the route choice algorithm
to these states to see if user optimum states attainable by externally tuning all agents’
strategies are realized. ⋆1 and ⋆2 have been chosen as representatives of states in which
the new road is expected to improve the traffic situation: For both types of externally
tuned strategies, i.e. for fixed numbers of agents following fixed routes and for all cars
deciding according to the same turning probabilities, in states ⋆ 1 and ⋆2 the new road
leads to a 5link system with lower user optimum travel times than in the corresponding
4link system. State ⋆1 is a special state since in the 5link user optimum all cars use
new route while the old routes have higher travel times and are not used. In the user
optima of state ⋆2 all routes are used. State ⋆3 is a Braess state for externally tuned
strategies: the user optima in the 5link networks have higher travel times than those of
the corresponding 4link networks’ user optima. For fixed personal strategies, in state
⋆3 two user optima exist. State ⋆4 is a Braess state for externally tuned strategies and
fixed personal strategies. For externally tuned turning probabilities no (short term) user
optima exist in this state since fluctuating domain walls are found in the system.
More details about the described states of the four points ⋆1 to ⋆4 are found
in [19, 20]. Details for the exact parameters of the four states, their user optima and
the corresponding travel times of these user optima can be found in Appendix B. These
details are not essential if one is interested in qualitative effects, but might be helpful
for a quantitative understanding of the following results.
For the obtained results which are discussed in the remainder of the present section,
the parameters of the algorithm as introduced in Section 3 were always chosen to be:
pinfo = 0.9, (11)
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∆Tthres = 10, (12)
κj1,thres = κj2,thres = 0.1, (13)
cmem = 30 , (14)
where cmem is only needed for the case of personal historic information. As we consider
the continuous route choices in the Braess network to mirror a commuter scenario, it
is reasonable to assume that in the majority of times, drivers choose their routes with
the aim of minimizing their travel times, i.e. pinfo = 0.9. Furthermore it appears to be
realistic that a commuter remembers approximately one month of her last experienced
travel times (cmem. = 30). Assuming that drivers may not switch from their preferred
route if the expected saved time is really low, a value of ∆Tthres = 10 seems reasonable.
Figs. 4–11 show the results for all four states ⋆1 to ⋆4, each with public predictive
and personal historical information. All figures have parts (a) and (b). Parts (a) show
how the mean values of the travel times T¯i of the routes i develop with the system time
where all times are measured in numbers of performed Monte Carlo sweeps. For details
on the simulation process the reader is referred to [66]. The values of both routes in
the 4link system and of the three routes in the corresponding 5link systems are shown
for comparison. One can thus see if the new road leads to higher or lower travel times.
Additionally the travel times that are expected from the pure and mixed user optima of
the 4link and 5link systems with externally tuned strategies are shown for comparison
by the dotted grey lines whose values are given by the τi on the second y-axis on the
right.
Parts (b) of Figs. 4–11 show the two variables m
(j1)
l = 1 − M23/M and m
(j2)
l =
M14/(M14 +M153) ¶ against the system time
+. Here, the M14, M23 and M153 are the
numbers of cars which follow routes 14, 23 and 153 at that system time. The values of
the two variables m
(j1)
l and m
(j2)
l capture the fractions of agents using the three different
routes. Similar to the variables n
(j1)
l and n
(j2)
l , which we introduced in Eqs. (5),(6) in
the context of externally tuned fixed personal strategies, they describe the fraction of
particles turning ‘left’ of junctions j1 and j2, but in the present moment. They represent
the strategies that the particles choose as a result of the route choice algorithm. Due
to the algorithm their values can change before and during the rounds.
The m
(j1)
l and m
(j2)
l can be compared to the (n
(j1)
l , n
(j2)
l ) that realize the pure user
optima for externally tuned fixed personal strategies and the (γ, δ) that realize the mixed
user optima for externally tuned turning probabilities. Those strategies realizing the
user optima by externally tuning the route choices are also shown by the dotted grey
lines whose values are given by the σi on the second y-axis on the right of parts (b)
of Figs. 4–11. This allows to determine whether the algorithm drives the system into
a user optimum. This gives an indication on how close it is to an expected pure or
mixed optimum. To see if real pure user optima or real mixed user optima are realized,
further analysis is needed: in a real pure user optimum no individual users would switch
¶ In the 4link system only m
(j1)
l is needed which reduces to m
(j1)
l = M14/M
+ In [66] these two variables are called implicit turning probabilities γimp. and δimp..
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routes any more (this can not be seen from the m
(j1)
l and m
(j2)
l , since they only show the
sums of particles following specific routes). Situations without any individual particles
switching routes can not be obtained in our algorithm since pinfo < 1. Still, if the
number of switches is low one can presume that the algorithm brings the system close
to a pure user optimum. In a mixed user optimum one would expect a higher number
of individual route switches. To test if indeed a real mixed user optimum is realized a
further statistical analysis of the behaviour of all individual particles is needed. Such
an analysis is not shown here. The interested reader is referred to [66], where it is
performed (in parts) for the state ⋆3.
The results presented in the following all show single Monte Carlo simulations of
the systems. They were confirmed in numerous runs of the same instances of the system
with different RNG seeds, which showed the same behaviour apart from minor variations
due to the stochasticity of the process.
4.1. Public predictive information.
The results for the algorithm with public predictive information are shown in Figs. 4–7
for the four different states ⋆1 to ⋆4. Fig. 4 shows results for state ⋆1. One can see that
the user optima of both the 4link and the 5link networks are realized in a stable manner.
In the 4link network approximately half the agents choose route 14 and the other half
route 23 (Fig. 4 (b)). Their mean travel times (Fig. 4 (a)) equalize at the value expected
from the user optima obtained in networks with externally tuned strategies. In the 5link
network, apart from small fluctuations, almost all agents choose route 153 (Fig. 4 (b))
and this route has a lower travel time than the other two (almost unused) routes in the
5link and also lower than those in the 4link system (Fig. 4 (a)). The “E5 optimal, all
153” state that is expected is thus realized.
The results for state ⋆2 are shown in Fig. 5. In the 4link system a user optimum
is realized. We can see that approximately M/2 agents use routes 14 and 23 without
large fluctuations (Fig. 5 (b)). The mean travel times of the two routes in the 4link
system thus equalize (Fig. 5 (a)). In the 5link system a different behaviour is observed.
In Fig. 5 (b) it can be seen that the expected user optimum is reached on average. The
numbers of cars on the three routes (as represented through the m
(j1)(5)
l and m
(j2)(5)
l in
Fig. 5 (b)) oscillate around the values expected from the (n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo ) and (γ
(5)
muo, δ
(5)
muo)
from the pure and mixed user optima for externally tuned strategies. Due to these
fluctuations the mean travel times of the three routes are close to each other but not
equal (Fig. 5 (a)). Opposed to the expectation, the mean travel times of routes 14 and
23 are actually higher than those in the 4link system. Thus, even if the user optimum of
the 5link system is realized on average, the algorithm with public predictive information
drives the system into a state which is more of ‘Braess nature’ in the sense that the 5link
travel times are higher than the 4link’s, opposed to the expected “E5 optimal” state.
Fig. 6 shows results for the case of public predictive information in state ⋆3. As in
the two previous states, the user optimum of the 4link system is realized. As seen in
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Figure 4. Results in state ⋆1 if public predictive information is provided. As
seen in (a), the mean travel times of both routes in the 4link system coincide with
those from the expectations. The travel time of route 153 in the 5link is the
lowest of the three routes. The expected travel times in the pure and mixed user
optima found by externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with
T
(4)
max,puo = τ2, T
(4)
max,muo = τ3, T
(5)
max,puo = T
(5)
max,muo = τ1. Part (b) shows that in
the 4link both routes are, as expected, used by equal amounts of agents, and in
the 5link almost all cars use route 153. The strategies realizing the user optima by
externally tuning the strategies are given for comparison with n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ2,(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
=
(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(5)
muo
)
= (σ3, σ1). The “E5 optimal, all 153” state is
realized.
Figure 6 (b) half of the particles use routes 14 and 23. As can be seen in Figure 6 (a) the
travel times of both routes equalize at the expected value. As detailed in Appendix B,
the 5link system of state ⋆3 with externally tuned parameters has two pure user optima
and one mixed user optimum. The values of the (n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(i/ii), n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(i/ii)) of neither of the
two pure optima puo(i) and puo(ii) coincides with the values of the (γ(5)muo, δ
(5)
muo) of the
mixed user optimum muo. In the 5link system the route choice algorithm produces
strong fluctuations around the pure user optimum puo(ii) (Fig. 6 (b)), a state in which
route 23 is not used and half the agents choose route 14 and the other half route 153.
Due to the fluctuations around the user optimum the travel times of the two used routes
(route 14 and 153) are close to each other but not exactly equal (Fig. 6 (a)). They are all
higher than those of the two routes in the 4link system. Thus a Braess state is realized.
The almost unused route 23 has an even higher travel time, as expected.
Fig. 7 shows results for state ⋆4. In the 4link system the user optimum is realized.
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Figure 5. Results for state ⋆2 if public predictive information is provided. As seen in
(a), the mean travel times of both routes in the 4link system coincide with those from
the expectations. In the 5link system, all three routes have higher mean travel times
than expected in the pure and mixed 5link user optima. The travel times are also
higher than those in the 4link. The expected travel times in the pure and mixed user
optima found by externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with
T
(4)
max,puo = τ3, T
(4)
max,muo = τ4, T
(5)
max,puo = τ2, T
(5)
max,muo = τ1. Part (b) shows that in
the 4link both routes are, as expected, used by equal amounts of agents. In the 5link
system fluctuations around the expected user optima are observed. The strategies
realizing the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for comparison
with n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ2,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
=
(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(5)
muo
)
= (σ3, σ1). Judging from
the mean travel time values, a Braess state instead of the expected “E5 optimal” state
is observed.
Even if fluctuations around the 4link user optimum are also small in state ⋆4, the travel
times of both routes equalize at a slightly higher value than expected (Fig. 7 (a)). This is
a consequence of jamming effects in front of j4 which play a larger role at higher densities.
In the 5link network with externally tuned particles only a pure user optimum exists
(see Appendix B). In the system with externally tuned turning probabilities fluctuating
domain walls are observed at such high densities and thus no (short term) user optimum
exists [19]. The route choice algorithm drives the system close to the pure user optimum.
The resultingm
(j1)(5)
l andm
(j2)(5)
l are slightly different from the expected (n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo )
in the pure user optimum. Furthermore they fluctuate (Fig. 7 (b)). Thus the travel times
of the three routes are not equal. Routes 23 and 153 have higher travel times than the
routes of the 4link system (Fig. 7 (b)), which can be interpreted as a kind of Braess
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Figure 6. Results for state ⋆3 if public predictive information is provided. As seen
in (a), the mean travel times of both routes in the 4link system coincide with those
from the expectations. In the 5link system, all three routes have unequal travel times,
all higher than those in the 4link. Travel times of route 14 and 153 are similar and
close to those expected in the 5link user optima. The expected travel times in the
pure and mixed user optima found by externally tuning the strategies are shown by
the dotted lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ2, T
(4)
max,muo = τ1, T
(5)
max,puo(i) = T
(5)
max,puo(ii) = τ4,
T
(5)
max,muo = τ3. Part (b) shows that in the 4link both routes are, as expected, used
by equal amounts of particles. In the 5link system strong fluctuations around one
of the three theoretically accessible user optima, i.e. around the pure user optimum
puo(ii), are observed. Route 23 is not used by many particles. The strategies realizing
the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for comparison with
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ3,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(i), n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(i)
)
= (σ3, σ1),
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(ii), n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(ii)
)
= (σ5, σ3),(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(4)
muo
)
= (σ4, σ2). The “Braess 1” state is realized on average.
behaviour.
One can conclude that the route choice based on public predictive information
typically drives the system into user optima in the 4link systems. This is not surprising
if one remembers how the predicted travel times are calculated (see Eqs. (8)–(10)): since
the 4link system is symmetric and the pure user optima are always given for an equal
distribution onto both routes, the algorithm which counts the numbers of particles for
its travel time predictions will always realize such user optima.
In the 5link networks user optima are not always realized since road 5 breaks the
symmetry of the 4link network. In the 5link network, the public predictive information
realizes user optima at low global densities. This is the case since in this density regime
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Figure 7. Results for state ⋆4 if public predictive information is provided. As seen in
(a), the mean travel times of both routes in the 4link system equalize, but at a slightly
higher value than the expectations. In the 5link system, all three routes have unequal
travel times, route 23 and 153 higher than those in the 4link, route 14 lower. The
expected travel times in the pure and mixed user optima found by externally tuning
the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ1, T
(5)
max,puo = τ2. Part (b)
shows that in the 4link both routes are, as expected, used by equal amounts of agents.
In the 5link system strong fluctuations around the theoretically accessible pure user
optima are observed. The strategies realizing the user optima by externally tuning the
strategies are given for comparison with n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = σ1,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
= (σ3, σ2).
the correlations between the roads do not influence the route travel times strongly.
At higher densities the correlations become more important leading to traffic jams
near junction sites. Here the travel time predictions become less accurate, leading
to fluctuations around the user optima. This can be seen in Appendix C, where the
accuracy of the predicted travel times is shown.
4.2. Personal historical information.
Results for the case of personal historical information are shown in Figs. 8–11 for the
four different states ⋆1 to ⋆4. In all parts (a) and (b) of these figures four vertical lines
are shown. The two lines in brighter and darker grey correspond to the two relaxation
times of the 4link and 5link systems, respectively. The line further to the left indicates
the system time at which all agents have gathered at least one travel time experience for
each route. The line further to the right indicates the system time at which the memory
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capacities of all agents is full. The recording of the evolution of the mean travel time
starts once the relaxation process is finished.
Fig. 8 shows results for state ⋆1. The user optimum in the 4link system is reached
with small remaining fluctuations around the user optimum (Fig. 8 (b)). The travel
times of both routes in the 4link equalize at the expected values (Fig. 8 (a)). In the
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Figure 8. Results for state ⋆1 if personal historical information is provided. As
seen in (a), the mean travel times on the routes in the 4link system equalize at the
expected values. In the 5link system, the travel time on route 153 is slightly lower
than expected. The expected travel times in the pure and mixed user optima found
by externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ2,
T
(4)
max,muo = τ3, T
(5)
max,puo = T
(5)
max,muo = τ1. Part (b) shows that in the 4link and
5link networks, the strategies develop as expected in the theoretically accessible user
optima. In the 5link, route 153 is used almost exclusively. The strategies realizing
the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for comparison with
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ2,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
=
(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(5)
muo
)
= (σ3, σ1). The “E5 optimal,
all 153” state is realized.
5link system the user optimum is also realized with some remaining fluctuations. Almost
all agents use route 153 (Fig. 8 (b)) which has a lower travel time than the other two
(almost unused) routes and also a lower travel time than the routes in the 4link system.
The results for state ⋆2 are shown in Fig. 9. Both in the 4link and 5link system
the user optimum is reached with some minor fluctuations (Fig. 9 (b)), as in state ⋆1.
The mean travel times of all three routes in the 5link system are almost equal to the
expected values and lower than those of the 4link system (Fig. 9 (a)). In contrast to the
algorithm with public predictive information where the 5link travel times were higher
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Figure 9. Results for state ⋆2 if personal historical information is provided. As seen in
(a), the mean travel times on the routes in the 4link and 5link systems equalize at the
expected values. The expected travel times in the pure and mixed user optima found
by externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ3,
T
(4)
max,muo = τ4, T
(5)
max,puo = τ2, T
(5)
max,muo = τ1. Part (b) shows that in the 4link and 5link
networks, the strategies develop as expected in the theoretically accessible user optima.
The strategies realizing the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for
comparison with n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ2,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
=
(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(5)
muo
)
= (σ3, σ1).
The “E5 optimal” state is realized.
than the 4link’s and the system thus showed Braess behaviour (Fig. 6 (b)), here the
expected “E5 optimal” state is realized.
Fig. 10 shows results for state ⋆3. As in the previous states ⋆1 and ⋆2 the 4link
user optimum is reached with some minor fluctuations. In the 5link system, the pure
user optimum puo(ii) (see Appendix B) is realized by the algorithm. Apart from some
minor fluctuations, approximately M/2 agents use routes 14 and 153, respectively. The
travel times of these routes equalize at a travel time below that of the almost unused
route 23 and above the travel times in the 4link system. The 5link user optimum is
reached in a more stable manner than in the system with public predictive information
(see Fig. 6).
Fig. 11 shows results for the case of personal historical information in state ⋆4. One
can see that in this case a long relaxation process is needed. This is due to the high
global density: as all agents want to gather travel time experiences for all three routes
in the beginning, this leads to routes getting blocked. The blockages are not permanent
gridlocks since agents will re-decide their route choices if they have to wait very long
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Figure 10. Results for state ⋆3 if personal historical information is provided. As
seen in (a), the mean travel times of the routes in the 4link system equalize at the
expected values. In the 5link system, the mean travel times of routes 14 and 153
equalize at a value lower than that of route 23, but higher than those of the 4link
system. The expected travel times in the pure and mixed user optima found by
externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ2,
T
(4)
max,muo = τ1, T
(5)
max,puo(i) = T
(5)
max,puo(ii) = τ4, T
(5)
max,muo = τ3. Part (b) shows that in
the 4link the strategies develop as expected in the theoretically accessible user optima.
In the 5link system, the pure user optimum puo(ii) is approached with some small
fluctuations. In the 5link system, routes 14 and 153 are used by approximately half
the agents each, while route 23 is almost not used at all. The strategies realizing
the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for comparison with
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = γ
(4)
muo = σ3,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(i), n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(i)
)
= (σ3, σ1),
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(ii), n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(ii)
)
= (σ5, σ3),(
γ
(5)
muo, δ
(4)
muo
)
= (σ4, σ2). The “Braess 1” state is realized.
at junctions j1 or j2. Nevertheless it takes quite long until the whole system is relaxed.
Once it is relaxed it stabilises quickly. As can be seen in Fig. 11 (b), in the 4link system
the user optimum is reached with larger fluctuations around the expected state than
for states ⋆1 to ⋆3. The effect of these larger fluctuations can also be seen in the mean
travel times of the two routes in the 4link: Fig. 11 (a) shows that the travel times’ mean
values only equalize after a relatively long time. The 5link systems’ user optimum is also
realized on average. Fluctuations around the pure user optimum persist (Fig. 11 (b)).
The mean travel times of the three routes are almost equal to the expected value of the
pure user optimum, above the travel times of the 4link system. Thus, here also a Braess
state is realized.
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Figure 11. Results for state ⋆4 if personal historical information is provided. In
this state with higher global density than states ⋆1 to ⋆3 a longer relaxation time is
needed, which is why a longer system time period is plotted as compared to Figs. 4
to 10. As seen in (a), the mean travel times of the routes in the 4link and 5link
systems equalize at the expected values. The expected travel times in the pure and
mixed user optima found by externally tuning the strategies are shown by the dotted
lines with T
(4)
max,puo = τ1, T
(5)
max,puo = τ2. Part (b) shows that in the 4link and 5link
the strategies develop as expected in the theoretically accessible user optima. The
strategies realizing the user optima by externally tuning the strategies are given for
comparison with n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = σ1,
(
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo , n
(j2)(5)
l,puo
)
= (σ3, σ2). The “Braess 1” state,
which for externally tuned route choices only exists with fixed route choices, is realized.
One can conclude that user optima of both the 4link and the 5link systems are
realized in all four states by the algorithm with personal historical information.
5. Conclusions
For drivers using public predictive information, user optima are realized at low global
densities. At higher global densities the user optima are still reached on average. The
kind of predictive information that we implemented depends on the current positions
of all agents in the system. It employs an approximation formula for the travel times
based on these positions. This kind of information is similar to that used in modern
smartphone apps which rely on crowdsourced data. The fact that the expected user
optima are realized, also in the Braess states, is a strong hint at the importance of the
paradox in modern traffic networks. As already proposed by previous observations of
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real world data [36, 37], smartphone apps seem to support the realization of user optima
in road networks.
In scenarios where drivers utilize only their own memories of travel times we could
also show that the user optima of the four test states are realized. Similar behaviour in
a two-route system without correlations and dynamics similar to TASEP and a similar
type of personal historical information was observed in [62], indicating that this finding
is rather general. We could show that the user optima are also realized in networks with
correlations: both in our 4link and 5link network the expected user optima are realized.
This further strengthens the importance of the paradox, since the reliance on personal
historical information is likely relevant in many commuter’s scenarios.
In future research it would be interesting to consider combinations of the latter
two types of information and see if drivers depending on different types of information
influence each other and the system as a whole. Are user optima also realized in this
case?
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Appendix A. Mixed user optima in Braess’ original example
As described in Sec. 2.2, the Braess paradox is also observed in Braess’ original model
if users choose their routes according to mixed strategies. Let p14, p23 and p153 be
the probabilities with which all users choose routes 14, 23 and 153, respectively. The
probabilities are subject to p14 + p23 = 1 or p14 + p23 + p153 = 1 for the 4link and 5link
systems, respectively.
In the 4link system, for mixed strategies (ms) the expectation values, denoted by
〈 T
(4)
i,ms 〉, of the travel times on the routes 14 and 23 are
〈 T
(4)
14,ms 〉 = 50 + (1 + p14 · (N − 1)) · 11 (A.1)
〈 T
(4)
23,ms 〉 = 50 + (1 + p23 · (N − 1)) · 11 (A.2)
for each car.
For N = 6 a mixed user optimum state (muo) is found for p14 = p23 = 1/2 with a
travel time expectation value of 〈 T
(4)
14,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(4)
23,muo 〉 = 88.5.
In the system with the new road, the expectation values of the travel times on the
three routes are
〈 T
(5)
14,ms 〉 = (1 + (p14 + p153)(N − 1)) · 10 + 50 + 1 + p14(N − 1) (A.3)
〈 T
(5)
23,ms 〉 = (1 + (p23 + p153)(N − 1)) · 10 + 50 + 1 + p23(N − 1) (A.4)
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〈 T
(5)
153,ms 〉 = (2 + (p14 + p23 + 2p153)(N − 1)) · 10 + 10 + 1 + p153(N − 1).(A.5)
Here a mixed user optimum is given for p14 = p23 = 5/13 and p153 = 3/13 with travel
time values 〈 T
(5)
14,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(5)
23,muo 〉 = 〈 T
(5)
153,muo 〉 = 93.6923.
For the case of mixed strategies the expected user optimum travel times are also
higher in the 5link system than in the 4link system, i.e. the paradox occurs also with
mixed strategies.
This example shows that the average number of cars on a specific route in the mixed
user optimum does not have to correspond to the (integer) number of cars on that route
in the pure user optimum: in the 5link system, the pure user optimum is for N = 6
given by distributing the users equally on the three routes. The mixed equilibrium is
not achieved by all users choosing the routes with equal probability!
Appendix B. The test states
The parameter sets for which the algorithm was tested are marked in Figs. 3 (a) and (b).
The corresponding travel time values that are expected in the existing pure and mixed
user optima (as found previously in [19] and [20]) are given in the following. See [19, 20]
as well for the naming scheme for the different states.
All these states are boundedly rational user optima [34]: in [19, 20] we found the
user optima of the systems by tuning the decisions of the particles externally (either
the N14, N23, N153 for fixed personal strategies or the γ, δ for turning probabilities) and
states for which ∆T = |T14 − T23|+ |T14 − T153|+ |T23 − T153| < 100 were considered to
be user optima. This means that the travel times on the three routes are not necessarily
exactly equal but are reasonably close to each other and we thus consider the states to
be user optima. Since the travel times are not necessarily exactly equal, we give here
the maximum travel time observed in those states as the reference time, which is used
as a comparison for the system with intelligently deciding particles.
state ⋆1: has the parameters L5 = 97 and M = 156 which correspond to Lˆ153/Lˆ14 =
0.5, ρ
(4)
global ≈ 0.13, ρ
(5)
global = 0.12. For externally tuned particles this is an “E5 optimal,
all 153” state both for fixed personal strategies and for turning probabilities.
In the 4link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(4)
14,puo = N
(4)
23,puo = 78 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,puo ≈ 692 and ∆T
(4)
puo → 0.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(4)muo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,muo ≈ 693 and ∆T
(4)
muo → 0.
In the 5link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(5)
14,puo = N
(5)
23,puo = 0 and N
(5)
153,puo = 156 which
corresponds to n
(j1)(5)
l,puo = 1.0 and n
(j2)(5)
l,puo = 0.0 with T
(5)
max,puo ≈ 615 and ∆T
(5)
puo = 0.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(5)muo = 1.0 and δ
(5)
muo = 0.0 with T
(5)
max,muo ≈ 615
and ∆T (5)muo = 0.
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state ⋆2: has the parameters L5 = 339 and M = 154 which correspond to Lˆ153/Lˆ14 =
0.9, ρ
(4)
global ≈ 0.13, ρ
(5)
global = 0.1. For externally tuned particles this is an “E5 optimal”
state both for fixed personal strategies and for turning probabilities.
In the 4link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(4)
14,puo = N
(4)
23,puo = 77 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,puo ≈ 691 and ∆T
(4)
puo → 0.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(4)muo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,muo ≈ 692 and ∆T
(4)
muo → 0.
In the 5link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(5)
14,puo = 36, N
(5)
23,puo = 30 and N
(5)
153,puo = 88 which
corresponds to n
(j1)(5)
l,puo ≈ 0.8 and n
(j2)(5)
l,puo ≈ 0.3 with T
(5)
max,puo ≈ 670 and ∆T
(5)
puo ≈ 22.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(5)muo = 0.8 and δ
(5)
muo = 0.3 with T
(5)
max,muo ≈ 667
and ∆T (5)muo ≈ 12.
state ⋆3: has the parameters L5 = 37 and M = 248 which correspond to Lˆ153/Lˆ14 =
0.4, ρ
(4)
global ≈ 0.21, ρ
(5)
global = 0.2. For externally tuned particles this is a “Braess 1” state
both for fixed personal strategies and for turning probabilities.
In the 4link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(4)
14,puo = N
(4)
23,puo = 124 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,puo ≈ 764 and ∆T
(4)
puo → 0.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(4)muo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,muo ≈ 763 and ∆T
(4)
muo → 0.
In the 5link system
• two pure user optimum exist for
(i) N
(5)
14,puo(i) = 0, N
(5)
23,puo(i) = 124 and N
(5)
153,puo(i) = 124 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(i) = 0.5 and n
(j2)(5)
l,puo(i) = 0.0 with T
(5)
max,puo(i) ≈ 978 and ∆T
(5)
puo(i) = 10.
(ii) N
(5)
14,puo(ii) = 124, N
(5)
23,puo(ii) = 0 and N
(5)
153,puo(ii) = 124 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(5)
l,puo(ii) = 1.0 and n
(j2)(5)
l, puo(ii) = 0.5 with T
(5)
max,puo(ii) ≈ 978 and ∆T
(5)
puo(ii) = 11.
• a mixed user optimum is given for γ(5)muo = 0.87 and δ
(5)
muo = 0.1 with T
(5)
max,muo ≈ 895
and ∆T (5)muo ≈ 78.
state ⋆4: has the parameters L5 = 218 and M = 712 which correspond to Lˆ153/Lˆ14 =
0.7, ρ
(4)
global ≈ 0.59, ρ
(5)
global = 0.5. For externally tuned particles this is an “Braess 1” state
for fixed personal strategies. For turning probabilities no user optima could be found
for these parameters.
In the 4link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(4)
14,puo = N
(4)
23,puo = 356 which corresponds to
n
(j1)(4)
l,puo = 0.5 with T
(4)
max,puo ≈ 1991 and ∆T
(4)
puo → 0.
• there is no short term mixed user optimum due to fluctuating domain walls
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In the 5link system
• a pure user optimum is given for N
(5)
14,puo = 357, N
(5)
23,puo = 178 and N
(5)
153,puo = 177
which corresponds to n
(j1)(5)
l,puo = 0.75 and n
(j2)(5)
l,puo ≈ 0.67 with T
(5)
max,puo ≈ 2177 and
∆T (5)muo ≈ 24.
• there is no mixed user optimum due to fluctuating domain walls.
Appendix C. Accuracy of the travel time predictions used for public
predictive information
In this section of the Appendix we discuss the accuracy of the travel time predictions that
are provided in the case of public predictive information, i.e. we discuss how accurate
the Ti,info as given by Eqs. (8)–(10) are. As can be seen in Figs. 4 to 7 and as discussed
in Section 4, only in state ⋆1 the the expected user optimum is realized in a stable
manner, while in states ⋆2 to ⋆4 especially in the 5link systems fluctuations around
user optima persist, resulting in (slightly) unequal mean travel times of the routes. In
Figs. C1 to C4 we show how accurate the travel time predictions are. For this, the
relative error of the Ti,info compared to the actually measured Ti are given: the Ti,info of
all routes i, predicted before starting a new round are saved for each particle. Once an
agent finishes a round, the travel time that the agent actually experienced on its chosen
route i (Ti) is measured. From this the relative error is computed as (Ti,info − Ti)/Ti.
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
-0.15
0.0
0.15
re
la
ti
v
e
er
ro
r
o
f
th
e
T
i,
in
fo
(a)
T14,info−T14
T14
T23,info−T23
T23
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
system time
-0.15
0.0
0.15
re
la
ti
v
e
er
ro
r
o
f
th
e
T
i,
in
fo
(b)
T14,info−T14
T14
T23,info−T23
T23
T153,info−T153
T153
Figure C1. Accuracy of the public predictive travel time predictions Ti,info for state
⋆1 in (a) the 4link system and (b) the 5link system, corresponding to the data shown
in Figure 4.
In Fig. C1 it can be seen that in state ⋆1 the predicted travel times are fairly
accurate, as the relative error of the predictions as compared to the actual measured
travel times lies beneath 15% at all times. This is not surprising since the global density
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is very low in that state and thus only small jamming effects and other correlation-
induced effects are expected. Judging from Fig. 4 (b) one can furthermore see that in
the 5link system almost all particles use route 153. Thus the system is more or less a
single periodic TASEP, for which Equation (7) is correct.
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Figure C2. Accuracy of the public predictive travel time predictions Ti,info for state
⋆2 in (a) the 4link system and (b) the 5link system, corresponding to the data shown
in Figure 5.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, in state ⋆2 in the 4link system the user optimum is realized
in a stable way. Judging from Fig. C2 (a) we can see that in this case the travel time
predictions are also accurate. This is for the same reasons as stated above for the 4link
system of state ⋆1. In the 5link system the user optimum is only reached on average
(Fig. 5). In Fig. C2 (b) it can be seen that the predicted travel times are off for up to
almost ±30%.
In state ⋆3, the predictions in the 4link system are still fairly accurate, as seen in
Fig. C3 (a). Accordingly also the user optimum in the 4link is realized well (Fig. 6). In
the 5link system we can see, that the predicted travel times are of by a large degree,
especially for route 153, they are at times more than 100% off. In Fig. C3 (b) one can
see, that at times when the travel time on route 153 is predicted too high, the travel
time on route 14 is predicted too low and vice versa. This could be the cause for the
fluctuations around the user optimum that can be seen in Fig. 6.
In state ⋆4 the global density has a value of ρ
(4)
global ≈ 0.59 and ρ
(5)
global = 0.5 and
is thus much higher than in the three other states. At a higher global density also
jamming effects, which are not covered by the simple approximations used for the travel
time predictions, become more important. As can be seen in Fig. C4 (a), in the 4link
system the travel times are predicted too low. This could be a consequence of neglecting
correlations and could be the cause of the slightly higher oscillations around the optimum
in the 4link system of state ⋆4 (Fig. 7 (b)) as compared to the 4link system of the other
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Figure C3. Accuracy of the public predictive travel time predictions Ti,info for state
⋆3 in (a) the 4link system and (b) the 5link system, corresponding to the data shown
in Figure 6.
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Figure C4. Accuracy of the public predictive travel time predictions Ti,info for state
⋆4 in (a) the 4link system and (b) the 5link system, corresponding to the data shown
in Fig. 7.
states and the resulting higher mean travel times than those expected from the user
optimum in systems with externally tuned strategies (Fig. 7 (a)). In Fig. C4 (b) one
can see that the travel times in the 5link system are also predicted too low. This could
also be the reason for the imperfect realization of the 5link’s user optimum (Fig. 7).
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